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The rate of erroneous conviction of innocent criminal defendants 
is often described as not merely unknown but unknowable. There 
is no syste matic method to determine the accuracy of a criminal 
conviction; if there were, these e rro rs would not occur in the first 
place. As a result, ve ry few fa lse convictions are ever discove red, 
and those that a re d iscovered are not re presentative of the group 
as a whole. In the United States, however, a high proportion of 
false convictions that do come to light and produce exonerations 
are concentrated among the tiny m inority of cases in which 
defenda nts are sentenced to death. This makes it possible to use 
data on death row exonerations to estimate the overall rate of 
false conviction among death sentences. The high rate of exoner-
ation among death•sentenced defendants appears to be driven by 
the threat of execution, but most death•sentenced defendants are 
removed from death row and resentenced to life imprisonment, 
after which the likelihood of exoneration drops sharply. We use 
survival analysis to model this effect. and estimate that if all 
death-sentenced defendants remained under sentence of death 
indefinitely, at least 4.1 % would be exonerated. We conclude that 
t his is a conservative estimate of t he proportion of false conviction 
among death sentences in the United States. 
capital punishment I criminal justice I wrongful conviction 
In the past few decades a surge of hundreds of exonerations of innocent criminal defendants has drawn attention to the 
problem of erroneous conviction, and led to a spate of reforms in 
criminal investigation and adjudication (1 3). All the same, the 
most basic empirical question about false convictions remains 
unanswered: How common are these miscarriages of justice? 
False convictions, by definition, are unobserved when they 
occur: If we know that a defendant is innocent, he is not con 
victed in the first place. They are also extremely difficult to de 
tect after the fac:t. As a result, the great majority of innocent 
defendants remam undetected. The rate of such errors is often 
described as a "dark fi~e" (4) an important measure of the 
performance of the cnminal justice system that is not merely 
unknown but unknowable. 
However, there is no shortage of lawyers and judges who as 
sert confidently that the number of false convictiom is negligible. 
Judge Learned Hand said so in 1923: "Our [criminal] procedure 
has always been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man 
convicted. It is an unreal dream" (5, p. 649). And in 2007, Justice 
Antonin Scalia wrote in a concurring opinion in the Supreme 
Court that American criminal convictions have an "error rate of 
[0].027 percent or, to put it another way, a success rate of 
99.973 percent" (6, p. 182). This would be comforting, if true. In 
fact, the claim is silly. Scalia's ratio is derived by taking the 
number of known exoneratiom at the time, which were limited 
~ost entirely to a small subset of murder and rape cases, using 
11 as ~ ~asll!e of all false convictions (known and unknown), 
and dividing ti by the number of all felony convictions for all 
crimes, from drug possession and burglary to car theft and in 
come tax evasion. 
To actually estimate the proportion of erroneous convictions 
we need a well defined group of criminal convictions within 
which we identify all mistaken convictions, or at least most. It is 
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hard to imagine how that could be done for criminal convictions 
generally, but it might be possible for capital murder. 
The rate of exonerations among death sentences in the United 
States is far higher than for any other category of criminal con 
victions. Death sentences represent less than one tenth of 1 % of 
prison sentences in the United States (7), but they accounted for 
about 12% of known exonerations of innocent defendants from 
1989 through early 2012 (2), a disproportion of more than 130 to 1. 
A major reason for this extraordinary exoneration rate is that far 
more attention and resources are devoted to death penalty cases 
than to other criminal prosecutions, before and after conviction. 
The vast majority of criminal convictions are not candidates 
for exoneration because no one makes any effort to reconsider 
the guilt of the defendants. Approximately 95% of felony con 
victions in the United States are based on negotiated pleas of 
guilty (plea bargains) that are entered in routine proceeding; at 
which no evidence is presented. Few are ever subject to any re 
view whatsoever. Most convicted defendants are never repre 
seated by an attorney after conviction, and the appeals that 
do. take place are usually perfunctory and unrelated to guilt 
or innocence. 
Death sentences are different. Almost all are based on con 
victions after jury trial , and even the handful of capital defend 
ants who plead guilty are then subject to trial like sentencing 
hearings, usually before juries. All death sentences are reviewed 
on appeal; almost aU are reviewed repeatedly. With few excep 
tiom, capital defendants have lawyers as long as they remain on 
death r<:!W. Everyone, from the first officer on the scene of 
a potentially capital crime to the Cllief Justice of the United 
States, takes capital cases more seriously than other criminal 
prosecutions and knows that everybody else will do so as well. 
And everyone from defense lawyers to innocence projects to 
governors and state and federal judges is likely to be particularly 
careful to avoid the execution of innocent defendants. 
This extraordinary diJJerence in resources and attention gen 
erates two related effects. (i) Advocates for a defendant are 
much more likely to pursue any plausible postconviction claim of 
innocence if the defendant is under sentence of death. (ii) Courts 
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(and other government actors) are much more likely to consider 
and grant such a claim if the defendant is at risk for execution. 
As a result, false convictions are far more likely to be detected 
among those cases that end in death sentences than in any other 
category of criminal convictions. 
The high exoneration rate for death sentences suggests that 
a substantial proportion of innocent defendants who are sen 
tenced to death are ultimately exonerated, perhaps a majority. If 
so, we can use capital exonerations as a basis for estimating a 
lower bound for the false conviction rate among death sentences. 
Since 1973, when the first death penalty Jaws now in effect 
in the United States were enacted (8), 143 death sentenced 
defendants have been exonerated, from 1 to 33 y after conviction 
(mean= 10.1 y) (9). In a previous study we found that 2.3% of all 
death sentences imposed from 1973 through 1989 resulted in 
exoneration by the end of 2004 (7). A study by Risinger (10) 
estimated that had biological samples been available for testing 
in all cases, 3.3% of defendants sentenced to death between 1982 
and 1989 for murders that included rape would have been ex 
onerated by DNA evidence through February 2006. That esti 
mate, however, is based on a small number of exonerations (n = 
11) (10). Both studies were limited to convictions that occurred 
15 y or more before the study date, and so include a high pro 
portion of all exonerations that will ever occur in the relevant 
groups. Nonetheless both studies underestimate the false con 
viction rate for death sentenced defendants because they do not 
reflect exonerations that occur after the study period, and do not 
include false convictions that are never detected at all 
Capital defendants who are removed from death row but not 
exonerated typically because their sentences are reduced to life 
imprisonment no longer receive the extraordinary level of at 
tention that is devoted to death row inmates. (This applies as 
well to those who are executed or die on death row from other 
causes.) If they are in fact innocent, they are much less likely to 
be exonerated than if they had remained on death row. As a re 
sult, the proportion of death sentenced inmates who are exon 
erated understates the rate of false convictions among death 
sentences because the intensive search for possible errors is 
largely abandoned once the threat of execution is removed. 
In other words, the engine that produces an exoneration rate 
that is a plausible proxy for the rate of false conviction among 
death sentenced prisoners is the proces.5 of reinvestigation and 
reconsideration under threat of execution. Over time, most 
death sentenced inmates are removed from death row and 
resentenced to life in prison at which point their chances of 
exoneration appear to drop back to the background rate for all 
murders, or close to it. Thus, we will get a better estimate of the 
rate of false capital convictions if are able to estimate "what the 
rate of capital exonerations would be if all death sentences were 
subject for an indefinite period to the level of scrutiny that 
applies to those facing the prospect of execution" (7). This study 
does just that. 
Cu1Tent Study 
Data We examine exonerations among defendants sentenced to 
death from the beginning of the "modem" death penalty in the 
United States in 1973, after the Supreme Court invalidated all 
prior death sentencing Jaws (11), through the end of 2004. Our 
data come from two sources. (i) Death sentences since 1973 are 
tracked by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) of the De 
partment of Justice, which maintains data on the current status 
of all death sentenced defendants in that period (12). We know 
that 7,482 defendants were sentenced to death in the United 
States from January 1973 through December 2004, and we know 
when (if ever) each defendant was removed from death row by 
execution, death by other means, or legal action by courts or 
executive officials. (ii) The Death Penalty Information Center 
maintains a list of defendants who were sentenced to death in the 
United States and exonerated since the beginning of 1973 (13), 
including 117 wbo were sentenced to death after January 1, 1973 
and exonerated by legal proceedings that began before the end 
of 2004. We collected additional data on these cases from public 
records and media sources, expanding on the dataset used by 
Gross and O'Brien (7). We were able to match on several key 
variables 108 of the 117 death sentence exonerations in this 
period to specific cases in the BJS database to produce the da 
tabase we analyzed. 
Table 1 displays the status of the 7,482 death sentenced 
defendants we studied as of December 31, 2004, the final day of 
our study period. On that date, 12.6% of these defendants had 
been executed, 1.6% were exonerated, 4% died of suicide or 
natural causes while on death row, 46.1 % remained on death 
row, and 35.8% were removed from death row but remained in 
prison after their capital sentences or the underlying convictions 
were reversed or modified. 
Table 1 is a snapsbot of the status of these defendants at the 
end of the study period. (It would look quite different if it dis 
played the status of death sentenced defendants at the end of 
1985, for example, or 2000.) It cannot be used directly to esti 
mate the rate of exoneration because exonerations are a function 
of time. Many of the defendants on death row at the end of 2004 
had only been there for a year or two, far less than the mean of 
10.1 y from conviction to exoneration for all capital exonerations 
since 1973. 
Over time, many of those who remained on death row at the 
end of 2004 will be removed (or already have been); most will 
end up with sentences of life imprisonment. If the pattern for 
death sentences from 1973 through 1995 bolds, over two thirds 
of prisoners sentenced to death will have the judgments against 
them overturned. The majority will remain in prison for life (14, 
15), but some will be exonerated and released. 
Threat of Execution. A central variable of interest is whether an 
exoneration took place while the defendant was still under 
threat of execution (for detailed information, see SI Materials and 
Table 1. Death-sentenced de fendants in the Un it e d Sta tes, 1973-2004 (n = 7,482) 
Gross et al. 
Proportion of all cases Time on death row, y Time to release, y 
Status as of December 31, 2004 Percent (n) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Executed 12.6 (943) 10.7 (4.8) NA 
Died on death row but not executed 4.0 (298) 7.7 (5.9) NA 
Still on death row 46.1 (3,449) 10.5 (6.3) NA 
Removed from death row but not exonerated 35. 8 (2,675) 5.4 (4.9) NA 
Exonerated, a II 1.6 (117) 6.7 (5.1) 9.1 (5.9) 
Exonerated, under threat of execution* 1.4 (107) 7.0 (5.2) 8.6 (5.6) 
Exonerated, not under threat of execution• 0.1 (10) 3.6 (2.6) 13.8 (7.5) 
NA. not applicable. 
*The defendant was exonerated by legal proceedings that were initiated before the end of 2004 and while the defendant was under 
sentence of death. 
' The defendant was exonerated by legal proceedings that were initiated before the end of 2004 but after the defendant was no longer 
under sentence of death. Data from the Death Penalty Information Center (9) and the BJS of the US Department of Justice (12). 
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Meth.ods, section 1). The status of the defendant as under threat 
is obvious when a defendant is exonerated and released directly 
from death row. On the other side, a defendant is clearly not 
under threat of execution when the exoneration is the product of 
a process that began years after removal from death row. 
In other cases, determining the threat status of the defendant 
at the time of exoneration is more demanding. We identify 
defendants who were under threat of execution to focus on 
exonerations that benefited from the extraordinary levels of ef 
fort and scrutiny that are applied to defendants who might be put 
to death. Many defendants who leave death row might be sent 
back. Hence the under threat of execution category includes 
defendants who were removed from death row but remained 
eligible for resentencing to death, and in whose cases the pros 
ecution was actively pursuing a new death sentence or consid 
ering whether to do so. For example, Ronald Williamson was 
sentenced to death in Oklahoma in 1988, and awarded a new 
trial in 1997 because of constitutionally inadequate representa 
tion by his trial lawyer (16). He was exonerated by DNA testing 
2 y later, in 1999, while awaiting a retrial at which he might have 
been sentenced to death again. His exoneration was under threat 
of execution. 
We also count an exoneration as under threat if the process 
that ultimately led to the exoneration began while the defendant 
was on death row, even if the final decision to release the de 
fendant was made after he left death row. This sort of delay is 
common for defendants who are removed from death row when 
their convictions are reversed by reviewing courts but not re 
leased until months or years later when the prosecution decides 
to dismiss the charges. In some cases the process is more elab 
orate. For instance, John Thompson was sentenced to death in 
Louisiana in 1985 (13). In 2001 he sought a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence, but received only a reduction in his 
sentence to life imprisonment. Thompson successfully appealed 
the denial of a new trial and was acquitted in 2003. Thus, al 
though his death sentence was vacated 2 y before his acquittal, 
we treat him as exonerated under threat of execution because the 
legal proceedings that led to exoneration began while he was on 
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We define an exoneration under threat of execution as an 
exoneration that is the result of legal proceedings that were 
initiated while the defendant was on death row. The date we 
assign to an exoneration is the date of removal from death row, 
the last date on which the exoneration can be initiated and still 
count as under threat, not the date on which the process was 
completed. Using these criteria, we determined that 107 of the 
117 exonerations that occurred before the end of 2004 were 
under threat of execution, and 10 exonerations were not under 
that threat. The significance of this classification is apparent 
from Table 1. Of defendants sentenced to death since 1973, 
35.8% had been resentenced to a prison term by the end of2004. 
However, only 85% of capital exonerations (10 of 117) came 
from this group even though these prisoners were, by definition, 
at a later stage of their imprisonment than those who remained 
on death row. (Except for those who are exonerated and a very 
small group who are resentenced to lesser penalties and even 
tually released all prisoners who are sentenced to death do 
ultimately die in prison. They all start out on death row, some 
stay there until death by execution by other means, and the rest 
eventually are moved to the general prison population where 
they remain until they die.) 
Our estimate of the rate of false convictions among death 
sentenced defendants is based on the hypothesis that death 
sentenced prisoners who remain under threat of execution are 
far more likely to be exonerated than those who remain in prison 
but no longer face that threat. We use a Cox proportional haz 
ards model with a time dependent covariate to test that hypoth 
esis. We find, consistent with expectations, that death sentenced 
defendants who are no longer under threat of execution had 
a rate of exoneration approximately one eighth of that for 
defendants who remained on death row, 0.131 (P < 0.0001) 
(with 95% confidence interval of 0.064 0.266) (SI Materials 
and Methods, section 3). 
Analysis. Our task is to estimate the cumulative probability over 
time of the event of interest, exoneration, in the population of 
death sentenced defendants who remain under threat of execu 
tion. The temporal measure (t) is time from conviction. Esti 
mating this probability is complicated by the structure of the 
25 30 
Fig. 1. The status of death sentenced defendants 
and the occurrence of exonerations, by time from 
conviction. The black line represents the total num 
ber of all death sentenced defendants by time from 
conviction and the gray line the number of defend 
ants who remained on death row (DR) and were 
therefore available for exoneration under threat of 
execution by time from conviction. The three areas 
between the black and gray lines display the dis 
positions of those defendants who were removed 
from death row over the time period by mode of 
removal: execution, suicide or death from natural 
causes, and legal proceedings (court orders or exec 
utive clemency). A minority of defendants who were 
removed from death by legal proceedings were ex 
onerated. The plus symbols mark exonerations by 
date measured in time from conviction. The 10 blue 
plus symbols (on the black line) mark exonerations 
that were not under threat of execution by the date 
of the completion of the exoneration. The 107 red 
plus symbols (on the gray line) mark exonerations 
that were initiated under threat of execution by the 
date of removal of the defendants from death row. 
Gross et al. 
population for two reasons. (i) Individual defendants joined this 
population across a 32 y period. Their duration in the srudy 
period varied from 1 to 32 y. (ii) All death sentenced defendants 
began, at conviction, under threat of execution, but for most that 
threat, and their membership in the population of interest, 
ended within several years, usually because they were resen 
tenced to life imprisonment. The net effect is that the number of 
defendants under threat of execution is a decreasing function of 
time from conviction, ranging from n = 7,482 at t = 0 y ton= 0 at 
t = 30.7 y (Fig. 1). 
To estimate this cumulative probability, we use survival anal 
ysis. This technique has been used in a related context, to esti 
mate the rate of all reversals of death sentences in the United 
States (15). It is most commonly used, however, to evaluate the 
efficacy of medical treatments when not all patients experience 
the outcome of interest. The issue we address is analogous, but 
the analogy is counterintuitive. 
We use survival analysis to assess the prospects of members of 
a population that is subject to a special risk. In the usual medical 
context, the condition that defines the population is a pathology 
such as Lyme disease or diabetes; for our study the defining 
condition is "death sentence." As a result of this condition, every 
member of this population is subject to the risk of a terminal 
event that might remove him from the group that has survived 
with this condition. In biomedical survival studies, that terminal 
event that is studied is death from the pathology in question; for 
our srudy it is exoneration. This is a counterintuitive equivalence: 
For our purposes, remaining in prison following a death sentence 
counts as "survival;" and exoneration, which removes the subject 
from prison, is analogous to "death" in the common context in 
which survival analysis is used. 
Survival analysis is often used to evaluate the efficacy of 
a medical treatment that may reduce mortality from a pathology. 
In this study the "treatment" that lowers the probability of the 
terminal event of interest (exoneration) is removal of the threat 
of execution. (This too is a counterintuitive analogy. Exonerating 
an innocent defendant is, of course, a good thing for that de 
fondant, but removal from death row is equivalent to a treatment 
that reduces the "risk" of exoneration.) Our focus, however, is 
not on the treated group (those removed from death row) but on 
those who remain untreated (defendants who remain under 
threat of execution and therefore at high risk of exoneration). 
In this study, as in medical research, subjects may be removed 
from the population of interest by means other than the terminal 
event at issue. In survival analysis of a disease, the usual means of 
exit by other means are death from a different cause or discon 
tinuation of participation in the study. In our study, all deaths 
after capital sentencing (by execution, suicide, or natural causes) 
remove the person from the population that is subject to the risk 
of execution. However, most removals from the population by 
means other than exoneration are by legal action that reduces 
the defendant's sentence to life in prison and thereby eliminates 
the threat of execution. 
A primary difficulty in estimating the cumulative probability of 
exoneration is that some defendants were censored, i.e., they did 
not have an opportunity to be exonerated under threat of exe 
cution during the srudy period. Some defendants were removed 
from that threat during the study period but would have been 
exonerated had they remained under threat; others, who were 
sentenced to death relatively recently, remained under threat 
and had not been exonerated at the end of the study period but 
would have been exonerated at some later point if the study 
period were extended. As a result, a simple proportion of ex 
onerated defendants to all defendants is a biased estimate of the 
cumulative probability of exoneration. 
We therefore use the Kaplan Meier estimator to calculate the 
cumulative probability of exoneration under threat of execution 
for death sentenced defendants, by time from conviction through 
2004. This estimator takes account of the censoring of observa 
tions caused by recency of incarceration on death row, death 
from suicide or natural causes, or other removals from the threat 
Gross et al. 
of execution. The Kaplan Meier survival function estimates the 
probability of being event free (remaining on death row) up to 
a given length of time from conviction. Its complement (1 minus 
the estimator) estimates the cumulative incidence of the event 
(exoneration) up to the given length of time from conviction. 
Unlike a simple proportion, the Kaplan Meier estimator is un 
biased in the presence of independent censoring (see further 
discussions in SensitiviJy Anal;5is), and is completely nonparametric; 
it can be viewed as a censored data analog of the empirical dis 
tribution function. (17, 18) (SI Materials and Meth.ods, section 2). 
As Fig. 2 shows, the cumulative probability of exoneration for 
death sentenced defendants who remained under threat of exe 
cution for 21.4 y was 4.1 % (with a 95% confidence interval of 
2.8 5.2% ). [We replicated the Kaplan Meier estimate of the 
cumulative probability of exoneration under threat of execution 
using the Fleming Harrington estimator. Both results are virtu 
ally indistinguishable (SI Materials and Meth.ods, section 3).] 
This 4.1 % estimate may approach the underlying rate of false 
convictions because it reflects the cumulative effect of a process 
that is uniquely efficient at detecting such errors. To rely on this 
estimate, however, two additional steps are necessary. 
Sensitivity analysis. An important assumption for the validity of the 
Kaplan Meier estimator is that censoring events that remove 
subjects from consideration are statistically independent of the 
time to the event of interest if the subjects had not been re 
moved. In this context, that assumption is plausible with respect 
to censoring by recency of conviction and by death from suicide 
or natural causes while under threat of execution. On the other 
hand, there are strong reasons to believe that hoth execution and 
removal from death row by legal procedures without exoneration 
are not independent of time to exoneration. Because the as 
sumption of independence may be violated, sensitivity analysis is 
necessary. 
Specifically, (i) 13% of death sentenced inmates were re 
moved from death row by execution (943 of 7,482). Some exe 
cuted defendants may have been innocent, and, although none 
has been exonerated after execution (9), they might have been 
exonerated if they had remained alive and on death row. How 
ever, we expect that the proportion of innocent defendants is 
* <D 
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25 
Fig. 2. Kaplan Meier (K M) estimat e of the cumulative rate of exonerat ion 
(solid line) and 95% confidence interval (dashed line) under threat of exe 
cution for defendants sentenced t o death in the United States from 1973 
t hrough 2004 by t ime from conviction to removal from death row. Exon 
eration under t hreat of execut ion is defined as exonerat ion that resulted 
from legal proceedings that were init iated before the end of 2004 and while 
t he defendant was under sentence of death. 
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lower among those who are executed than among those who 
remain on death row (7) (SI Materials and Meth.ods, section 4). 
The threat of execution is the engine that drives the process of 
exonerating innocent death row prisoners, and it is likely that this 
process becomes more painstaking as inmates approach their 
execution dates. This concern about executing innocent defend 
ants also drives a second bias: (ii) It increases the proportion of 
innocent defendants among the 36% of death row inmates who 
were removed from death row and resentenced to prison but not 
exonerated (2,675 or 7,482). Courts and executive officials ex 
plicitly recognize that it is appropriate to take the possibility of 
innocence into account in deciding whether to reverse a convic 
tion for procedural error or commute a death sentence to life 
imprisonment, and a wealth of anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this practice is widespread (SI Materials and Meth.ods, section 4). 
As a result, those who are resentenced to punishments less than 
death are more likely to be innocent than those who remain on 
death row. 
In short, we believe that (i) executed defendants are less likely 
to have been exonerated if they had remained on death row than 
those who in fact remained on death row, and (ii) defendants 
who were removed from death row but remained in prison are 
more likely to have been exonerated if they had remained under 
threat of execution. 
These two biases are not equivalent in magnitude. Nearly 
three times as many unexonerated death sentenced defendants 
were resentenced to prison (2,675) as were executed (943). Even 
a modest increase in the proportion of innocent defendants 
among death sentenced prisoners resentenced to life imprison 
ment, compared with those who remain on death row, would 
more than offset a complete absence of innocent defendants 
among those who are executed. 
We use competing risks methodology (18), along with explicit 
assumptions about the counterfactual probability of exoneration 
for those who were executed or resentenced to prison, to develop 
a sensitivity analysis for the Kaplan Meier estimate of the cu 
mulative exoneration rate. First, we estimate the cumulative 
incidence of exoneration subject to the competing risks of ex 
ecution and resentencing by 21.4 y after conviction, on the as 
sumption that censoring by recency, suicide, or natural death 
was independent of these three event processes. The estimates 
of the probabilities of removal from risk of exoneration by 
exoneration under threat of execution, by execution itself, or by 
resentencing, are 2.2% (1.7%, 2.7% ), 23.8% (22.3%, 25.3% ), 
and 48.3% ( 46.7%, 50.0% ), respectively. Thus, a defendant 
sentenced to death had an estimated 2.2% chance of being 
exonerated while under threat of execution by 21.4 y after 
conviction, assuming those executed or resentenced had zero 
chance of being exonerated (i.e., allowing for the competing 
risks of execution and resentencing) (SI Materials and Meth.ods, 
section 3) . 
Consider instead the assumption that, had they remained on 
death row, (i) those who were executed would have had zero 
chance of exoneration, and (ii) those who were resentenced 
would have had twice the chance of exoneration as the entire 
population of defendants sentenced to death. This yields the 
following estimate of the cumulative probability of exoneration, 
had those who were exonerated or resentenced instead remained 
on death row: 2.2% + 0 (23.8%) + 2 (2.2%) (48.3%) = 4.4%. 
Using the Delta method, the confidence interval for this estimate 
is 3.41 5.28%, assuming that the cumulative incidences of ex 
oneration and resentencing have zero covariance. 
A zero probability of exoneration for executed defendants had 
they remained on death row is necessarily, for the purposes of 
this estimate, a conservative assumption. We believe that the 
assumed probability of exoneration for those who were removed 
from death row and resentenced to prison, twice the mean for 
the population, is reasonable. We conclude that the Kaplan 
Meier estimate we obtained is conservative. Indeed the same 
result we would obtain if we assume that the probability 
of exoneration for those resentenced to prison, had they 
1234 I 
remained on death row, is equal to or greater than 1.77 times 
the population average [2.2% + 0 (23.8%) + 1.77 (2.2%) 
(48.3%) = 4.1%]. 
Estimating false convictions from exonerations. Because there is no 
general method to accurately determine innocence in a criminal 
case, we use a proxy, exoneration: an official determination that 
a convicted defendant is no longer legally culpable for the crime 
for which he was condemned. There will be misclassifications. 
Some exonerated defendants are guilty of the crimes for which 
they were sentenced to death. We expect that such errors are 
rare, given the high barriers the American legal system imposes 
on convicted defendants in persuading authorities to reconsider 
their guilt (1 3, 7) (SI Materials and Methods, section 4). To date, 
one such case has come to light, and has been reclassified (19). 
Monte Carlo simulations reveal that the effect of such mis 
classifications on the cumulative rate of exoneration is linear: If 
10% of exonerated defendants were in fact guilty, the mean 
cumulative rate of innocence for death sentenced defendants 
would be 3.7% rather than 4.1 % (95% confidence interval of 
3.3 4.0% ); if 20% were guilty, the mean rate would be 3.3% 
(95% confidence interval of 2.8 3.7%) (SI Materials and Meth 
ods, section 3). 
On the other side, some innocent defendants who remained 
on death row for more than 21.4 y but were not exonerated are 
misclassified as guilty. Some may still be exonerated; some may 
be executed; and most will likely die in prison, on death row or 
off, of natural causes or suicide. In the absence of better data we 
assume that the probability of a legal campaign to exonerate any 
prisoner under threat of death who has a plausible innocence 
claim is 1, and we assume that the probability of success for an 
innocent prisoner who remains under such threat for at least 
21.4 y is also 1. These are necessarily conservative assumptions. 
To the extent that these probabilities are in fact less than 1, our 
estimate will understate the actual rate of false convictions. t 
The distribution of possible misclassifications is asymmetrical: 
216 defendants remained on death row longer than 21.4 y, whereas 
only 107 were exonerated under threat of execution. Unless the 
process of death row exoneration is assumed to be unrealistically 
thorough, it is likely that the number of innocent death sentenced 
defendants misclassified as guilty exceeds the number of guilty 
defendants exonerated under threat of execution and misclassified 
as innocent. [The proxy we use (the exoneration rate) is also im 
portant in its own right: It is a direct measure of the rate of death 
sentencing of defendants later determined to be legally not guilty.] 
Taken together, the sensitivity analysis and the likely net 
effects of misclassification both point in the same direction and 
suggest that our 4.1 % estimate of the rate of false conviction 
among death sentenced defendants is conservative. 
Discussion 
We present a conservative estimate of the proportion of erro 
neous convictions of defendants sentenced to death in the 
United States from 1973 through 2004, 4.1 %. This is a unique 
finding; there are no other reliable estimates of the rate of false 
conviction in any context. The main source of potential bias is 
the accuracy of our classification of cases as true or false con 
victions. On that issue it is likely that we have an undercount, 
that there are more innocent death row defendants who have not 
been identified and exonerated than guilty ones who have been 
exonerated in error. 
The most charged question in this area is different: How many 
innocent defendants have been put to death (6)? We cannot 
estimate that number directly but we believe it is comparatively 
tA reviewer of an earlier draft suggested an alternative analytic approach. The suggested 
approach postulates a campaign process that gives some but not all death--sentenced 
defendants the opportunity to be exonerated. Identification of the false conviction rate 
is then based on independence assumptions between innocence and removal from 
death row. W ith more complete data of the sort required for the best realization of 
this insightful approach, we believe that it would offer a particularly valuable supple-
ment,, and test of the robustness. of our findings and conclusions. 
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low. If the rate were the same as our estimate for false death 
sentences, the number of innocents executed in the United 
States in the past 35 y would be more than 50 (20). We do not 
believe that has happened. Our data and the experience of 
practitioners in the field both indicate that the criminal justice 
system goes to far greater lengths to avoid executing innocent 
defendants than to prevent them from remaining in prison in 
definitely. One way to do so is to disproportionately reverse 
death sentences in capital cases in which the accuracy of the 
defendants' convictions is in doubt and to resentence them to life 
imprisonment, a practice that makes our estimate of the rate of 
error conservative. However, no process of removing potentially 
innocent defendants from the execution queue can be foolproof. 
With an error rate at trial over 4%, it is all but certain that 
several of the 1,320 defendants executed since 1977 were in 
nocent (21). 
It is possible that the death sentencing rate of innocent 
defendants has changed over time. No specific evidence points in 
that direction, but the number and the distribution of death 
sentences have changed dramatically in the past 15 y (22). One 
change, however, is unlikely to have much impact: the advent of 
DNA identification technology. DNA evidence is useful pri 
marily in rape rather than homicide investigations. Only 13% of 
death row exonerations since 1973 (18 of 142) resulted from 
postconviction DNA testing (13), so the availability of pre 
conviction testing will have at most a modest effect on that rate. 
Unfortunately, we cannot generalize from our findings on 
death sentences to the rate of false convictions in any broader 
category of crime. Capital prosecutions, and to a lesser extent 
murder cases in general, are handled very differently from other 
criminal cases. There are theoretical reasons to believe that the 
rate of false conviction may be higher for murders in general, 
and for capital murders in particular, than for other felony 
convictions, primarily because the authorities are more likely to 
pursue difficult cases with weak evidence of guilt if one or more 
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people have been killed (23). However, there are no data that 
confirm or refute this hypothesis. 
We do know that the rate of error among death sentences is 
far greater than Justice Scalia's reassuring 0.027% (6). That 
much is apparent directly from the number of death row exon 
erations that have already occurred. Our research adds the 
disturbing news that most innocent defendants who have been 
sentenced to death have not been exonerated, and many 
including the great majority of those who have been resen 
tenced to life in prison probably never will be. 
This is only part of a disturbing picture. Fewer than half of all 
defendants who are convicted of capital murder are ever sen 
tenced to death in the first place (e.g., 49.1% in Missouri as in 
ref. 24, 29% in Philadelphia as in ref. 25, and 31 % in New Jersey 
as in ref. 26). Sentencing juries, like other participants in the 
process, worry about the execution of innocent defendants. 
Interviews with jurors who participated in capital sentencing 
proceedings indicate that lingering doubts about the defendant's 
guilt is the strongest available predictor of a sentence of life 
imprisonment rather than death (27). It follows that the rate of 
innocence must be higher for convicted capital defendants who 
are not sentenced to death than for those who are. The net result 
is that the great majority of innocent defendants who are con 
victed of capital murder in the United States are neither exe 
cuted nor exonerated. They are sentenced, or resentenced to 
prison for life, and then forgotten . 
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